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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMJACS INTERWEST, INC., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, , 
vs. No. 16236 
CARL SMITH, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RES~ONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Appellant properly states the case in its 
brief. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ,Amjacs Interw·est, Inc., brought 
an action against Carl Smith, ("Smith") personally as well as 
against all partners of Design Associates, a Utah partnership. 
On June 20, 1978, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment 
against Smith personally and Unico, Inc., a Utah corporation. 
Smith filed a counter-motion and asked to be dismissed from 
the suit. Judgment was granted against Unico, Inc., because 
it was clearly a partner in Design Associates. Unico, Inc. 
was a corporation solely owned by Smith. Plaintiff argued that 
the terms of the partnership agreement made Smith personally a 
partner in Design Associates. Plaintiff also argued equitable 
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relief should be granted them against Smith and that u · n1co, 
was merely a shield for Smith. The Court held smi'th was not 
personally liable and the cause of action against Smith was 
dismissed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Design Associates was a partnership made by written 
agreement on December 26, 1975, and the first paragraph of that 
agreement states as follows: 
"This agreement entered into between Unico, Inc., 
hereinafter referred to as Uni co, and Richard Fletcher, 
Gordon Steed, and Jerald Granquist, collectively 
hereinafter referred to as the firm." (R. 52, R. 102, 
Exhibit A) 
The above individuals signed the partnership agreement and 
Unico, Inc. signed "Carl T. Smith, President, Unico, Inc." 
(R. 102, Exhibit A). Carl Smith declared by affidavit he had 
never been a partner in Design Associates, that he personal~ 
had no knowledge of any merchandise, goods or services being 
obtained from Arnjacs by Design Associates until the account 
became delinquent, and that he had never representated to Mj~ 
or ever represented publicly that he was a partner in or an age· 
of Design Associates (R. 109,110). Design Associates, the 
partnership, became indebted to Arnj acs between November 1, 19711 
· submitt' to June 20, 1977 (R. 96). Lengthy interrogatories were 
by Arnjacs, Unico, Inc. and Smith (R. 29-45, R. 53-56) and I 
. d certai' I 
approximately 11 pages of answers to interrogatories an 
5 7-59 I 86-~:: partnership documents were filed in the record (R. 
91-93), and in addition, affidavits were submitted by Arnjacs' I 






general manager and Carl Smith, along with attachments thereto. 
(R. 96, 109-110). In total, the lower court had some 113 
pages of pleadings and evidence to consider after reviewing 
each party's briefs and hearing their arguments in open court, 
and thereupon, the Court found that Carl Smith could not have 
been a partner as a matter of law and dismissed the cause of 
action as to him. (R. 115). Thereupon, plaintiff appealed to 
this court. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING SMITH'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING THE ACTION 
AS TO HIM. 
There was substantial evidence showing that Unico, Inc. 
was a partner in Design Associates, principally the partnership 
agreement itself. Although there is substantial evidence in 
~he record relating to the relationship of Design Associates 
as debtors to Amjacs and liability on the part of all partners 
to the partnership agreement, there is no evidence that Carl 
Smith should be found personally liable for payment of the debt 
incurred by the partnership. 
POINT I 
THE WRITTEN PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT DOES NOT ESTABLISH 
SMITH PERSONALLY AS A PARTNER IN DESIGN ASSOCIATES. 
Design Associates partnership agreement entered prior 
to any indebtedness to Amjacs declares who the partners 
are, ie.Unico, Inc., Richard Fletcher, Gordon Steed, and 
-3-
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Jerald Granquist. (R. 102, Exhibit A). Further emphasis of 
that point is made when the president of Unico, Inc. signed 
"Carl T. Smith, President, Unico, Inc." (R. 102, E.xhibit A), 
Plaintiffs claim that Smith was one of the partners by 
alluding to such language as "Whereas, Smith is in a positioo 
to assist in the business through initial financing through 
his solely owned corporation, Unico, Inc." (R. 102, ExhibitA), 
and other such references to Smith's name in the partnership 
agreement, that he is a partner. It is common knowledge 
that all corporations operate through individuals and Smith, 
as president of the corporation, was acting on behalf of ~e 
corporation. He even signed the partnership agreement as 
"President, Unico, Inc." Any reference to the use of his 
talents in the partnership agreement must be construed as 
reference to his talents as president of Unico, Inc. because 
of the manner in which the document was drafted. To rule 
otherwise would make it necessary to totally ignore the well 
established laws governing partnerships as well as corporations. 
Certainly, there was ample evidence before the court to make 
the determination that Carl Smith was not a partner in Desi~ 
Associates based upon the written partnership documents in 
existence. 
POINT II 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE FOR CONSIDERATION BY 
THE LOWER COURT THAT CARL SMITH WAS NOT A PARTNER 
UNDER ANY EQUITABLE THEORIES OF PARTNE~SHIP SUCH 
AS ESTOPPEL OR ALTER EGO. 
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Plaintiffs are demanding that the case be referred back to the 
lower court for additional evidentiary hearings to establish that 
under some equitable principles, Amjacs is entitled to recovery 
against Smith personally by disregarding the corporation structure 
of Unico, Inc. One of their theories is partnership by estoppel. 
Utah Code Annotated, 48-1-13, (1953 as amended), reads: 
"Partner by Estoppel - 1. When a person by 
word spoken or written or by conduct represents 
himself, or consents to another's representing 
him, to anyone as a partner, in an existing 
partnership or with one or more persons not 
actually partners, he is liable to any such 
person to whom such representation has been 
made who has on the faith of such representa-
tion, given credit to the actual or apparent 
partnership, and, if he is made such repre-
sentation or consented to it being made in a 
public manner, he is liable to such person, 
whether the representation has or has not 
been made or communicated to such person so 
giving credit by, or with a knowledge of, 
the apparent partner making the representa-
tion or consenting to it being made." 
There can be no equitable relief under the partnership by 
estoppel statute because Amjacs never relied on any representa-
tions made by Carl Smith that he would, in fact, be liable as 
a partner. (R. 109,110). The best Amjac can do is claim that 
sometime after June 8, 1977, after most of the debt was already 
incurred, they received a 1976 Unico, Inc. balance sheet which, 
at the bottom, stated, "Principal: Carl T. Smith" with an Ogden, 
Utah address. (R. 97, Exhibit B). At that point in time, the 
bull was already out of the chute - the indebtedness had been 
incurred prior to that date. (R. 2, 97, Exhibit C). Amjacs 
-5-
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even ad.mi ts they were dealing with "Design Associates and not I 
I 
Carl Smith", when they declare that "Carl Smith did not person- i 
,' 
ally ever submit a written request to the plaintiffs for the 
goods and services which were supplied to the defendants." {R, 
There is ample evidence in the record to show that Carl Smith 
was not partner by es toppe 1. 
The second equitable theory is that of alter ego. The 
brief submitted in support of plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment to the trial court claims Smith was only trying to use 
the corporation as a shield and that any way you look at it, th: 
result is the same. "Carl Smith is personally liable for the 
debts of Design Associates, as is his solely owned corporation, 
Unico, Inc. " (R. 102), and that he .... "has at times tried to 
use his solely owned corporation as a shield " (R 102). , . . . . . I 
Certainly, that theory of alter ego was before the court below. 
Plaintiff now claims that there are still so many material f~t 
left open concerning that issue that this court should reverse 
the lower court and return the case for additional evidence. 
They refer to numerous cases in an effort to bolster their 
position. It is defendant's position that the lower court had 
available to it all the evidence that was necessary to resolve I 
that equitable issue. 
Any consideration of disregarding the corporate structilll 
must commence with the presumption that there is a valid corpoCI 
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"Un~er some circumstances, the corporate 
entity may be disregarded in the interests 
of justice in such cases as fraud contra-
vention of law or contract, or public wrong. 
However, great caution should be exercised 
by the courts in disregarding the entity." 
E.R. Shaw v. Bailey-McCune Company, 355 P2d 
321, 322 (Utah 1960). 
The court further cautioned about disregarding the corporate 
entity, even though the stock is owned by a single individual. 
That concept, as well as a restatement of the factors that must 
be shown to find alter ego are declared in an earlier case of 
Surgical Supply Center v. Industrial Commission, 223 P 2d 593, 
596 (Utah 1950). Only to prevent fraud or defend crime or 
injustice will the court look through the veil of corporate 
structure. Court in that case declared, 
"While upon ~quitable principles, the legal 
entity of a corporation may be disregarded 
when it is the mere alter ego or business 
conduit of an individual, or when the notion 
of its legal entity is used to defeat public 
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, 
or defend crime, (1 Fletcher, CYC. COR., 135), 
still, it is the general rule that although 
one person owns all the stock of a corpora-
tion he and the corporation are in law, two 
sepa~ate and distinct persons." (Supra, 596). 
Therefore, to disregard the corporate structure and enter judg-
ment against Carl Smith personally, the court must find that 
Carl Smith used the corporate structure to: 
a. Commit fraud, 
b. Justify wrong, 
c. Contravene law or contract, 
d. Or defend crime. 
-7-
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The facts are so clear with many pages of evidence in ' 
this case that none of the above were committed by Carl Smith, 
that the corporate structure should not be disreg,arded. Carl 
Smith at no time represented to AmJ'acs that he would be person-
1 
ally liable for the debt they are now attempting to collect l 
from the partnership. He simply had no dealings at all with 
them, and it was only after the debt was incurred, they began 
to try and recover from him. Amjacs could have exercised 
caution about whom they were dealing with before the debt was 
incurred or not have allowed the debt to get out of hand, as 
it did, but they obviously elected to run the risks. How they 
are before this court arguing that Carl Smith has either 
committed fraud, justified wrong, contravened law or contract, 
or defended crime, or at least there is not ample evidence 
before the lower court to make the determination that has occ~r:J 
and they should have a rehearing on that issue. The evidence 
is overwhelming that none of the foregoing did occur, based upc; 
the record. Amj acs contracted with Design Associates for pay· 
ment of the debt. They never did contract with Carl Smith 
personally. That is clear in the record. They simply never 
did look to Carl Smith for payment of the debt until after it 
. . (R. 87) and all had been incurred, as per their own admission. 
the · d · · h world are not going to change evi entiary hearings in t e 
the facts as clearly established below. The record shows the 1 
location and function of Unico, Inc. since the date of its 
I 
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incorporation in 1966, (R. 49), every line of business engaged 
in, the types of business engaged in, each person who had been 
affiliated with Unico, Inc. in the positions of chief executive 
officer, chief operating officer, general manager, secretary, 
treasurer, chairman of the board, members of the board, sales 
manager or equivalent, every person who had been legal or 
official owner of more than ten percent of any stock since the 
date of its incorporation, the relationship that any such parties 
had to Carl Smith, any transfers of property to any business 
entity of Carl Smith, and transfers of property to Carl Smith 
directly, any considerations therefore, and numerous pages of 
such questions which were a part of the record for consideration 
by the court below. (R. 49-52, 92-93). And now plaintiff 
requests that this court send this case back for additional 
evidence under the apparent theory that failure to do so would 
"promote injustice". The evidence is already so clear that 
there is not an injustice to Amjacs or the public by failure to 
disregard the corporate structure. Plaintiffs have relied 
heavily on Plotkin v. National Lead Company, 482 P.2d 323, 
(Nev. 1971). In that case, summary judgment had been entered 
against Mr. and Mrs. Plotkin, who had been the owners of stock 
in a corporation named American Paint & Supply. The Plotkins 
had written to National Lead, to whom the corporation was 
balance We Owe You through American Paint" indebted "regarding the 
and then later, Mrs. Plotkin stated to counsel for National Lead 
, h "$ 2 36 was the correct indebtedness amount·" t:at 1,70. It was 
-9-
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obvious the facts were not clear that the corporation structure 
should be disregarded with such evidence in the record, and of 
course, the matter was referred back for additiona~ hearing 
after the court stated that the facts on the record did not 
support the alter ego theory, as follows: 
"It is apparent that under the facts as related, 
there was not an assumption of the corporate 
debt. It is equally clear that the scanty 
record will not permit one to conclude, as a 
matter of law, that the alter ego doctrine 
should be applied. The record, at this moment, 
does not disclose that the corporation was 
governed by the Plotkins; that there was such 
a unity of interest and ownership that one is 
inseparable from the other; and that adherence 
to the fiction of separate entity would promote 
injustice." 
The facts are totally different in this case, in that then~ 
clear record evidence below that no injustice would occur by 
failure to apply the concept of alter ego. Again, the law 
states that to apply the equitable principle of alter ego again:: 
an individual by disregarding the corporate veil, there must 
be a clear showing that there was such a "unity of interest and 
ownership that one is inseparable from the other and . ··I 
that adherence to the fiction of separate entity \vould promote 
injustice." McCleary Cattle Co. v. Sewell, 73 Nev. 279,317 PM 
957. The only injustice imaginable in this case would be f~ 
Carl Smith personally to be required to pay Amj acs for a debt 
contracted between Amj acs and Design Associates partnership. 
Amjacs simply could never show they will suffer a wrong, fraud 
or injustice at the hands of Carl Smith in this case, because I 
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they never did look to him for payment until after the fact. 
The record is clear that the principle of alter ego or other 
equitable reliefs claimed by plaintiffs will not apply in this 
case and that is what the trial court determined in dismissing 
Smith from the suit. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs' claim that additional evidence is 
required to resolve the issues at bar is unwarranted. The 
record is clear that Carl Smith was not a partner in Design 
Associates, that Amjacs could never show fraud, public wrong 
or injustice at the hands of Carl Smith and that the corporate 
structure should not be set aside and disregarded herein. The 
findings and order of the trial court should be sustained. 
~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS ::V-7-day of June, 1979. 
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